Control of Charging of Electric Vehicles through Menu-Based Pricing by Ghosh, Arnob & Aggarwal, Vaneet
1Control of Charging of Electric Vehicles
through Menu-Based Pricing
Arnob Ghosh and Vaneet Aggarwal, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract
We propose an online pricing mechanism for electric vehicle (EV) charging. A charging station
decides prices for each arriving EV depending on the energy and the time within which the EV will
be served (i.e. deadline). The user selects either one of the contracts by paying the prescribed price or
rejects all depending on their surpluses. The charging station can serve users using renewable energy
and conventional energy. Users may select longer deadlines as they may have to pay less because of the
less amount of conventional energy, however, they have to wait a longer period. We consider a myopic
charging station and show that there exists a pricing mechanism which jointly maximizes the social
welfare and the profit of the charging station when the charging station knows the utilities of the users.
However, when the charging station does not know the utilities of the users, the social welfare pricing
strategy may not maximize the expected profit of the charging station and even the profit may be 0. We
propose a fixed profit pricing strategy which provides a guaranteed fixed profit to the charging station
and can maximize the profit in practice. We empirically show that our proposed mechanism reduces the
peak-demand and utilizes the limited charging spots in a charging station efficiently.
Index Terms
Electric vehicle charging, menu-based pricing, energy harvesting, myopic strategy, social welfare.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electric Vehicles (EVs) have several advantages over the traditional gasoline powered vehicles.
For example, EVs are more environment friendly and more energy efficient. Thus, regulators
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2(e.g. Federal Energy Regulator Commission (FERC)) are providing incentives to the consumers
to switch to electric vehicles. However, the successful deployment of charging stations crucially
depends on the profit of the charging stations and how efficiently the resources are used for
charging the electric vehicles. Without profitable charging stations, the wide deployment of the
EVs will remain a distant dream. On the other hand, because of the environment-friendly nature
of the electric vehicles, it is also important for the regulators to increase the user (or, consumer)
surplus to provide an incentive for the users. Hence, selecting a price is an imperative issue
for the charging stations. The charging station may have limited charging spots or renewable
energy harvesting devices. Hence, intelligent allocation of the resources among the EVs is a key
component for fulfilling the potential of EVs’ deployment.
We propose a menu based pricing scheme for charging an EV. Whenever an EV arrives, the
charging station offers a variety of contracts (l, tdead) at price pl,tdead to the user where the user
will be able to use up to l units of energy within the deadline tdead for completion. The EV user
either accepts one of the contracts by paying the specified price or rejects all of those based on
its payoff. We assume that the user gets an utility for consuming l amount of energy with the
deadline tdead. The payoff of the user (or, user’s surplus) for a contract is the difference between
the utility and the price paid for one contract. The user will select the option which fetches the
highest payoff.
The various advantages of the above pricing scheme should be noted. First, it is an online
pricing scheme. It can be adapted for each arriving user. Second, since the charging station
offers prices for different levels of energy and the deadline, the charging station can prioritize
one contract over the others depending on the energy resources available. Favorable prices for
shorter deadlines can attract users to vacate the charging stations early and only use it when it
is necessary. Third, the user’s decision is much simplified. She only needs to select one of the
contracts (or, reject all) and will receive the prescribed amount within the prescribed deadline.
Fourth, the pricing mechanism is inherently individual rational1, incentive compatible2, and
truthful3.
1Individual rationality means that the user will only select one of the contracts if it gets non-negative payoff.
2Individual compatibility denotes that the user will select only that contract which gives the optimal payoff.
3Truthfulness implies that the users will not achieve a higher payoff by delaying their arrivals or selecting a sub-optimal
strategy. Hence, the pricing mechanism is robust against the strategy selection of the users.
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3We consider that the charging station is equipped with renewable energy harvesting devices
and a storage device for storing energies. The charging station may also buy conventional energy
from the market to fulfill the contract of the user if required. Hence, if a new user accepts the
contract (l, tdead), a cost is incurred to the charging station. This cost may also depend on the
existing EVs and their resource requirements. Hence, the charging station needs to find the
optimal cost for fulfilling each contract. We show that obtaining that cost is equivalent to solve
a linear programming problem.
We consider two optimization problems–i) social welfare4 maximization, and ii) the EV
charging station’s profit maximization. We first propose a pricing scheme which maximizes the
social welfare irrespective of whether the charging station is aware of the utilities of the users
or not. The pricing scheme is simple to compute, as the charging station selects a price which is
equal to the marginal cost for fulfilling a certain contract for a new user (Theorem 2, Corollary
1). However, the above pricing scheme only provides zero profit to the charging stations. Thus,
such a pricing scheme may not be useful to the charging station. We show that when a charging
station is clairvoyant (i.e., the charging station knows the utilities of the users), there exists a
pricing scheme which satisfies both the objectives (Theorem 3). Though in the above pricing
mechanism, the user’s surplus becomes 0. Thus, a clairvoyant charging station may not be
beneficial for the user’s surplus.
The charging station may not know the exact utilities of the users, however, it may know
the distribution function5 from where it is drawn. We investigate the existence of a pricing
mechanism which maximizes the ex-post social welfare i.e. maximizes the social welfare for
every possible realization of the utility function. In the scenario where the charging station does
not know the exact utilities of the users, we show that there may not exist a pricing strategy which
simultaneously maximizes the ex-post social welfare and the expected profit. One has to give
away the ex-post social welfare maximization in order to achieve expected profit maximization.
Thus, unlike when the charging station is clairvoyant, there may not exist a pricing strategy
which simultaneously satisfies both the objectives when the exact utilities are unknown. We
propose a pricing strategy which can fetch the highest possible profit to the charging station
under the condition that it maximizes the ex-post social welfare (Theorem 4). Above pricing
4Social welfare is the sum of the profit of the charging station and the user surplus.
5We do not put any assumption on the distribution function
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4strategy provides a worst case maximum profit to the charging station. We show that such a
pricing strategy can fetch a higher profit when the charging station can harvest a large amount
of renewable energy. However, the profit only increases up to a certain threshold, beyond that
threshold harvested energy has no effect on the profit.
Since the above pricing strategy may not yield the maximum expected profit to the charging
station, we have to relax the constraint the social welfare to be maximized in order to yield a
higher profit to the charging station. Whether a contract will be selected by the user does not
depend on the price of the contract, but also the prices of other contracts. Thus, achieving a
pricing scheme which maximizes the expected profit is difficult because of the discontinuous
nature of the profits. We propose a pricing strategy which yields a fixed (say, β) amount of
profit to the charging station. We show that the above pricing strategy also maximizes the social
welfare with the desired level of probability for a suitable choice of β (Theorem 5). Hence, such
a pricing scheme is also attractive to the regulators. Further, we show that a suitable choice of
β can maximize the profit of the charging station for a class of utility functions (Theorem 7).
Finally, we, empirically provide insights how a trade-off between the profit of the charging
station and the social welfare can be achieved for various pricing schemes (Section VI). We also
show that how our pricing scheme can increase greater utilization of the resources and result in
a lower number of charging spots compared to the existing ones.
The proofs are deferred to the technical report [2] owing to the space constraint.
Related Literature: To the best our knowledge this is the first attempt to consider contract
based online pricing for controlling both the energy and deadline of the EVs. However, other
pricing mechanisms to control the charging pattern of EV in a residential charging in a day-
ahead market are proposed [3]–[8]. In contrast to the residential charging, in a commercial or
workplace charging station, users do not have control of charging the car at each instance. They
need a certain amount of energy within a deadline. In our proposed mechanism, the charging
station selects different prices for different options and the user only needs to select a contract,
it does not need to control the charging pattern at each instance.
Optimal pricing for a day-ahead demand response program have been studied [9], [10].
However, we need an online pricing mechanism in the EV charging station. Since the charging
station is unaware of the future arrivals of the users and has limited renewable energy, determining
the optimal pricing in such a setting is more challenging. The menu-based pricing is an online
pricing mechanism and can enhance the efficient usage of the resources by controlling the
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5deadline. Unlike in the demand response program, the users also do not need to control the
demand for each instance in our menu-based pricing.
[11] proposed an online VCG auction mechanism. However, in [11] the user’s payment is
determined at the end of the day, and thus users are not sure how much they have to pay
beforehand. Hence, it may not be preferred by the users. In contrast, in our mechanism the
users select one of the contracts and pay the prescribed price beforehand. In [12]–[15] online
scheduling algorithms have been proposed for charging EVs. The main focus of these papers was
scheduling, they did not consider the optimal pricing approach for the charging station which
we did. Further, unlike in [12]–[15], in our menu-based pricing scheme, the charging station can
control the energy requirement and the deadline of the users by selecting the prices to the users.
Hence, a greater flexibility can be achieved. Additionally, [12], [15] did not guarantee that the
energy demand will be fulfilled. In contrast, in our model once a user opts for an option, the
EV charging station always fulfills the request of users.
In the deadline differentiated pricing [16]–[19], each user’s total energy consumption is fixed,
however the user can specify the deadline. On the contrary, in our proposed menu-based pricing
mechanism each user can jointly choose any pair of energy level and deadline. The deadline
differentiated pricing is suited for a day-ahead offline setting where an equilibrium price is
attained for a specific set of pre-determined decision of the users. However, the users’ utilities
and thus optimal decision may change in real time and thus, the deadline differentiated pricing
may not be suitable for online setting. Our menu-based pricing approach is online, where the
price menu is adapted for each arriving user. Further, [18] assumed that the price setter knows the
utilities of the users. [16], [19] assumed that the utility functions are strictly concave, and [17]
put some restrictions on the utility functions to achieve optimality. However, such assumptions
are not necessary for our approach.
II. MODEL
We consider a charging station which wants to select a pricing strategy in order to maximize
its payoff over a certain period of time T (e.g. one day). Suppose that user k = 1, . . . , K arrives
at the charging station at time tk. The charging station decides a price menu or a contract pk,l,t
to user k for different energy levels l ∈ {1, . . . , L} and deadline t ∈ {tk + 1, . . . , T} (Fig. 1).6
6In Section V, we show that if the support of the distributions of the user’s utilities have the same lower end-point, our
proposed menu-based price mechanism essentially becomes equivalent to a ime-of-use price mechanism.
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Fig. 1. The trading model: Charging station offers a menu of
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all.
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Fig. 2. The hybrid energy source with a limited capacity
Battery.
It is needless to say that we can discretize the time and energy at any level that one may want7,
however, the computational cost will increase. User k has to decide l and t based on the menu;
if she decided to accept any option on the menu, she has to pay the prescribed price pk,l,t. The
user can decide not to accept any price too (Fig 1). The EV may not be charged continuously
i.e. preemption is allowed. A preempted battery of the EV can be resumed charging from the
previous battery level upon preemption.
A. User’s utilities
If user k selects the price option pk,l,t, it will get an utility uk,l,t. Hence, its surplus or payoff
will be uk,l,t − pk,l,t. If the user rejects all the options then its utility is 0 (Fig. 1). We assume
that the realized value uk,l,t is drawn from a distribution function of the random variable Uk,l,t.
The random variables Uk,l,t need not be independent, in fact, they can be generated from a
joint distribution. In practice, there is a correlation of the utilities among different deadlines and
charging amount. For example, Uk,l1,t ≥ Uk,l,t if l1 > l as a higher amount of energy for a fixed
deadline should induce higher utility to a user. Similarly, Uk,l,t1 ≤ Uk,l,t2 if t1 > t2 since for a
similar level of charge, the user will prefer the smaller deadline menu as it will give the user
more flexibility. On the other hand, a user who wants to park a long time may not mind a longer
deadline. Thus, we do not make any a priori assumptions on the utility functions since they can
7It is an online mechanism, we can easily extend it for fixed maximum deadline scenario for EVs by extending the time
horizon.
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7be different for different users. We assume that the car vacates the charging spot once it exceeds
its prescribed deadline8.
B. The charging Station
1) Hybrid Energy Source: We assume that the charging station can obtain energies for
fulfilling the charging request both from the renewable sources and conventional sources (Fig. 2).
The charging station can buy a conventional energy qt at a price ct for usage during the interval
[t, t+1). We do not assume any specific type of pricing schemes for buying conventional energy,
however, we assume that ct is known. If the real time pricing is used, then we consider ct as
the expected real-time price at time t.
The charging station is also equipped with an energy harvesting device and a storage capacity
of Bmax (Fig. 2). The harvesting device harvests E¯t amount of energy between [t, t + 1). We
assume that the marginal cost to harvest renewable energy is 0. The amount of energy that the
charging station uses from the storage for the time [t, t+ 1) be rt.
2) System Constraints: The charging station must procure the l amount of energy for user k
by time dk if the user accepts the price menu pk,l,dk . Let qk,t be the conventional energy and rk,t
be the energy from the storage device used by the charging station to charge user k for time
interval [t, t+ 1). Then, we must have the following constraint
dk−1∑
t=tk
(rk,t + qk,t) ≥ l (1)
Suppose that initially, there is a set of users K0 already present in the charging station at time
tk. Now, the user i ∈ K0 has a deadline of wi and additional demand Ni. The charging station
must have to satisfy the demand of those users. Thus, the charging station must also satisfy
wi−tk−1∑
t=tk
(ri,t + qi,t) ≥ Ni,∀i ∈ K0 (2)
We also assume that the charging station has one kind of charging equipment (either slow
charging or fast charging) and there is a maximum rate constraint (Rmax). Hence,
rk,t + qk,t ≤ Rmax, ri,t + qi,t ≤ Rmax∀i ∈ K0 ∀t. (3)
8If the user can not take away its car, the charging spot will be automatically downgraded to a mere parking spot i.e. without
any charging facility.
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energy, qt bought from the market, thus,
rk,t +
∑
i∈K0
ri,t = rt, qk,t +
∑
i∈K0
qi,t ≤ qt ∀t (4)
Note that the charging station may store the unused conventional energy bought from the market
i.e. qt−qk,t−
∑
i∈K0 qi,t is stored in the storage device. The charging station may buy an additional
amount of conventional energy at time t, if the future prices are higher.
Let the battery level at time t + 1 be Bt+1 and B0 be the initial battery level. The charging
station also wants to keep the battery level at the end of the day as B0. If the final battery level
need not match the initial level, our pricing approach can be easily extended to that scenario.
If the battery can not hold the excessive energy, then it is wasted. Let use denote the wasted
energy for time [t, t+ 1) be Dt ≥ 0, 9then
Bt+1 = Bt + E¯t − rt + qt − qk,t −
∑
i∈K0
qi,t −Dt
0 ≤ Bt+1 ≤ Bmax, Btk = B0 BT = B0. (5)
The constraints in (4) and (5) put a bound on the maximum amount of energy can be used for
charging.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The profit of the charging station inherently depends on whether the user will accept that
menu or not. Hence, before how the charging station will select pk,l,t for user k, we delve into
the decision process of the users.
A. User’s decision
A user selects at most one of the price menus in order to maximize its payoff or surplus.
We assume that the user is a price taker. Thus, for a menu of prices pk,l,t, the user k selects
9It is also straightforward to extend our setting when the charging station can sell the excess energy to the grid, i.e. it will
sell Dt to the grid.
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9Ak,l,t ∈ [0, 1] such that it maximizes the following
maximize
L∑
l=1
T∑
t=tk+1
Ak,l,t(uk,l,t − pk,l,t)
subject to
L∑
l=1
T∑
t=tk+1
Ak,l,t ≤ 1 (6)
Note from the formulation in (6) the maximum is achieved when Ak,l,t = 1 for the contract which
maximizes the user k’s payoff (i.e., maxi,j{uk,i,j − pk,i,j} = uk,l,t− pk,l,t.) and is 0 otherwise. If
such a solution is not unique, any convex combination of these solutions is also optimal since
a user can select any of the maximum payoff contracts. We denote the decision as Ak,l,t(pk).
Note that the decision whether to accept the menu pk,l,t not only depend on the price pk,l,t but
also other price menus i.e. pk,i,j where i ∈ {1, . . . , L} and j ∈ {tk + 1, . . . , T} as the user only
selects the price menu which is the most favorable to himself. Note that if the maximum payoff
that user gets among all the price menus (or, contracts) is negative, then the user will not charge
i.e. Ak,l,t = 0 for all l and t. We also assume that if there is a tie between charging and not
charging, then the user will decide to charge i.e. if the maximum payoff that user can get is 0,
then the user will decide to charge.10
B. Myopic Charging Station
Since the users arrive for the charging request at any time throughout the day, the charging
station does not know the exact arrival times for the future vehicles. We consider that the charging
station is myopic or near-sighted i.e. it selects its price for user k without considering the future
arrival process of the vehicles. However, it will consider the cost incurred to charge the existing
EVs. Note that as the number of existing users increases, the marginal cost can increase to fulfill
a contract for an arriving user, hence, such a pricing strategy may not maximize the payoff in a
long run. We, later show that a myopic pricing strategy is optimal in the case the marginal cost
of fulfilling a demand of a new user is independent of the number of existing users.
In practice, the charging station often has fixed number of charging spots, thus, the charging
station may want to select high prices for user k, in order to make the charging spots available
for the users who can pay more but only will arrive in future11. However, such a pricing strategy
10Our result can be readily extended to the other options, in that case the price strategies given in this paper have to be
decreased by an  > 0 amount.
11The above consideration is left for the future work.
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is against the first come first serve basis which is the current norm for charging a vehicle. Our
approach considers a fair allocation process, where the charging station serves users based on
the first come first serve basis. Later in Section VI, we show that since the charging station can
control the time spent by an EV through pricing, our approach results into a lower number of
charging spots compared to the existing pricing mechanism.
C. Charging Station’s Decisions and cost
Note that if the user k accepts the menu (l, dk). Then, the charging station needs to allocate
resources among the EVs in order to minimize the total cost of fulfilling the contract. First, we
introduce some notations which we use throughout.
Definition 1. The charging station has to incur the cost vl,dk for fulfilling the contracts of existing
customers and the contract (l, dk) of the new user k, where vl,dk is the value of the following
linear optimization problem:
Pl,dk : min
∑T−1
t=tk
ctqt
subject to (1), (2), (3), (4), (5)
var: rk,t, qk,t, qt, rt, Dt ≥ 0 (7)
Note that our model can also incorporate time varying, strictly increasing convex costs Ct(·)12.
Since Pl,dk is a linear optimization problem, it is easy to compute vl,dk . Also, note that if the
above problem is infeasible for some l and t, then we consider vl,t as ∞. We assume that the
prediction E¯t is perfect for all future times and known to the charging station13.
Definition 2. Let v−k be the amount that the charging station has to incur to satisfy the
requirements of the existing EVs if the new user does not opt for any of the price menus.
12Our model can also incorporate the scenario where there is a constraint on the maximum value of conventional energy can
be bought from the market at a given time.
13 Menu-based pricing approach can be extended to the setting where the estimated generation does not match the exact amount.
First, we can consider a conservative approach where E¯t can be treated as the worst possible renewable energy generation.
As a second approach, we can accumulate various possible scenarios of the renewable energy generations, and try to find the
cost to fulfill a contract for each such scenario. For example, if there are M number of possible instances of the renewable
energy generation amount in future. Then, we can find the optimal cost for each such instance of renewable energy generation
E¯m,t where m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} instead of E¯t . We then can compute the average (or, the weighted average, if some instance has
greater probability) of the optimal costs, and that cost can be taken as the cost of fulfilling a certain contract.
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If user k does not accept any price menu, then the charging station still needs to satisfy the
demand of existing users i.e. the charging station must solve the problem Pl,t with qk,t = rk,t = 0.
v−k is the value of that optimization problem. Thus, from Definitions 1 and 2 we can visualize
vl,dk−v−k as the additional cost or marginal cost to the charging station when the user k accepts
the price menu pk,l,dk . It is easy to discern that vl,dk − v−k is non-negative for any dk and l.
D. Profit of the charging station
Now, we discuss the profit of the charging station based on its pricing strategies. Note that if
all the spots are occupied then, the charging station can not accommodate a new user. Thus, we
consider the scenario where a charging spot is available.
1) Pricing with Perfect Foresight: First, we consider the scenario where the charging station
has a perfect foresight of the utility of the user i.e. the charging station is clairvoyant and has
a perfect knowledge about the user’s utility. Note that if the user k selects the price menu pk,l,t,
then the charging station has to pay vl,t amount (Definition 1). Thus, the charging station has
to pay additional amount vl,t − v−k (Definition 2) when the user selects the price menu pk,l,t.
Thus, the profit of the charging station is
L∑
l=1
T∑
t=tk+1
(pk,l,t − vk,l,t + v−k)Ak,l,t(pk) (8)
Note that here the charging station selects a price pk,l,t to maximize its own profit. Ak,l,t > 0
only if pk,l,t gives the highest payoff for the user k as discussed in Section III-A.
2) Prediction Based Pricing: In practice the charging station may not know the exact realiza-
tion of the utility function of the users. Thus, it can only use predictions of the utility function
in order to select the price menu. Here, we consider such a scenario where the charging station
does not know the exact utilities of the user.
We assume that the charging station knows the statistic of the user’s utility. Let Rk,l,t be the
event that the price menu pk,l,t is selected, hence, the profit of the charging station is
L∑
l=1
T∑
t=tk+1
E[(pk,l,t − vl,t + v−k)1Rk,l,t ]
=
L∑
l=1
T∑
t=tk+1
(pk,l,t − vl,t + v−k) Pr(Rk,l,t) (9)
The indicator variable Rk,l,t in (9) denotes the event that the contract (l, t) is being chosen by
the user k. The expectation is taken over the joint distribution of Uk,l,t. The expected profit
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maximization problem for the charging station is to maximize the above objective over pk,l,t.
We assume that the utilities are distributed according to some continuous distribution14. Hence,
Pr(Rl,t) is given by
Pr(Rk,l,t) = Pr(Uk,l,t − pk,l,t ≥ (max
i,j
{Uk,i,j − pi,j})+)
Thus, Pr(Rk,l,t) not only depends on pk,l,t, but also prices for other menus.
E. Objectives
We consider that the charging station decides the price menus in order to fulfill one of the
two objectives (or, both)–i) Social Welfare Maximization and ii) its profit maximization.
1) Social Welfare: The social welfare is the sum of user surplus and the profit of the charging
station. As discussed in Section III-A for a certain realized values uk,l,t if the user k selects the
price menu pk,l,t, then its surplus is uk,l,t − pk,l,t, otherwise, it is 0.
As discussed in Section III-D the profit of the charging station is pk,l,t − vl,t + vk for a given
price pk,l,t if the user selects the menu, otherwise it is 0. Hence, the social welfare maximization
problem is to select the price menu pk,l,t which will maximize the following
Pperfect :maximize
L∑
l=1
T∑
t=tk+1
(uk,l,t − vl,t + v−k)Ak,l,t(pk)
var : pk,l,t ≥ 0. (10)
Recall that in order to find vl,t we have to solve Pl,t(cf. (7)) which is a constrained optimization
problem. Since EV is expected to increase the social value such as providing a cleaner environ-
ment, and higher energy efficiency, hence, it is important for a regulator (e.g. FERC) whether
there exists a pricing strategy which maximizes the social welfare of the system. If the charging
station is operated by the regulator or some government agency, then the main objective is indeed
maximizing the social welfare or user surplus is maintained.
Ex-ante and Ex-post Maximization: When the charging station is unaware of the utilities of
the users, then two options are considered–i) decides a price and hopes that it will maximize the
social welfare for the realized values of utilities (ex-post maximization), or ii) decides a price
and hopes that it will maximize the social welfare in an expected sense (ex-ante maximization).
Thus, the ex-ante maximization does not guarantee that the social welfare will be maximized for
14However, it can be easily extended to discontinuous distribution case.
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every realization of the random variables Uk,l,t. However, in the ex-post maximization, the social
welfare is maximized for each realization of the random variables. Thus, ex-post maximization
is a stronger concept of maximization (and thus, more desirable) and it is not necessary that
there exist pricing strategies which maximize the ex-post social welfare. However, we show that
in our setting there exist pricing strategies which maximize the ex-post social welfare. Note that
ex-post social welfare maximization is the same as (10).
2) Profit Maximization: Social welfare maximization does not guarantee that the charging
station may get a positive profit. It is important for the wide-scale deployment of the charging
stations, the charging station must have some profit. Further, if the charging station is operated
by a private entity its objective is indeed to maximize the profit.
When the charging station is clairvoyant, then the charging station wants to maximize the
profit given in (8) by selecting pk,l,t. On the other hand when the charging station does not know
the user’s utility, then it wants to maximize the expected payoff given in (9) by selecting pk,l,t.
3) Separation Problem: Note that in order to select optimal pk,l,t, the charging station has to
obtain vl,t and v−k (Definitions 1 & 2). However, vl,t and v−k do not depend on pk,l,t. Hence,
we can separate the problem–first the charging station finds vl,t and vk, and then it will select
pk,l,t to fulfill the objective. We now focus on finding optimal pk,l,t.
IV. RESULTS: SOCIAL WELFARE MAXIMIZATION
First, we state the optimal values of the social welfare for any given realization of the user’s
utilites. Next, we state a pricing strategy which attains the above optimal value.
Note that if uk,l,t− vl,t + v−k < 0 for each l and t, then the social welfare is maximized when
the user k does not charge or equivalently, the price pk,l,t is very high for each l and t. In this
case, the optimal value of social welfare is 0.
On the other hand if uk,l,t−vl,t ≥ −v−k for some l and t, then the social welfare is maximized
when the user k charges its car. If the user accepts the price menu pk,l,t, then the social welfare
is uk,l,t − vl,t + v−k. Thus, the maximum social welfare in the above scenario is maxl,t(uk,l,t −
vl,t + v−k). Hence-
Theorem 1. The maximum value of social welfare is max{maxl,t(uk,l,t − vl,t + v−k), 0}.
Note that even though the maximum value of social welfare is unique (as in Theorem 1), the
optimal pricing strategy is not unique. In the following, we give one possible pricing strategy
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that achieves the optimal social welfare.
Theorem 2. The pricing strategy pk,l,t = vl,t − v−k maximizes the social welfare.
Note that in the pricing strategy, the charging station does not need to know the utility of the
users. It optimizes the social welfare for each possible realization of the utility functions. Hence,
we obtain
Corollary 1. The pricing strategy pk,l,t = vl,t − v−k maximizes the ex-post social welfare.
Though the pricing strategy maximizes the social welfare, the above pricing strategy does not
provide any positive profit to the charging station. Thus, the charging station may not prefer this
pricing strategy as it will not have any incentive to provide the charging spots.
Also note that the pricing strategy also maximizes the social welfare in the long run when
the additional cost of fulfilling a contract (i.e. vl,t − v−k) does not depend on the existing users
in the charging station. The condition that vl,t − v−k is independent of the existing EVs in the
charging station is satisfied if either all demand can be fulfilled using renewable energy or there
is no renewable energy generation and the conventional energy is bought at a flat rate. Hence,
in the two above extreme cases, the myopic pricing strategy is also optimal in the long run.
V. PROFIT MAXIMIZATION OF THE CHARGING STATION
A. Charging station with perfect foresight
We now provide a price strategy which maximizes the profit of the charging station and also
the social welfare when the charging station is clairvoyant. Recall that the profit of the charging
station is given by (8).
First, we introduce a notation.
Definition 3. Let (l∗, t∗) =argmaxl,t{uk,l,t − vl,t}.
Theorem 3. Set pk,l,t = vl,t−v−k+(uk,l∗,t∗−vl∗,t∗+v−k)+ where (l∗, t∗) is defined in Definition 3.
Such a pricing strategy maximizes the profit as well as the social welfare.
The above pricing strategy is an example of value-based pricing strategy where prices are set
depending on the valuation or the utility of the users [20]. The user’s utility dependent pricing
strategy is also proposed in smart grids in some recent papers [7], [21]. In contrast, the price
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strategy stated in Theorem 2 is an example of cost-based pricing strategy where the prices only
depend on the costs. If the utilities of the users are same, the pricing strategy becomes similar
to a time-dependent pricing scheme, which is prevalent in practice.
In the value-based pricing strategy, the user surplus decreases, in fact it is15 0 in our case. Thus
all the user surplus is transferred as the profit of the charging station. Hence, when the charging
station is clairvoyant, then the pricing strategy which maximizes the profit of the charging station
and it does not entail any positive user surplus.
Note that there can be other pricing strategies which simultaneously maximize the social
welfare and the profit. For example, if pk,l,t is ∞ for all (l, t) 6= (l∗, t∗) and pk,l∗,t∗ = vl∗,t∗ −
v−k + (uk,l∗,t∗ − vl∗,t∗ + v−k)+, then it also maximizes the profit of the charging station. Thus,
in this scenario, it can give only one possible contract to the EVs.
Though the joint profit maximizing and social welfare pricing strategy may not be unique,
the profit of the charging station is the unique and is given by
(uk,l∗,t∗ − vl∗,t∗ + v−k)+ (11)
B. Prediction based pricing
1) Maximum Profit under ex-post social welfare maximization: Note from Theorem 3 that
the profit maximization pricing strategy which maximizes the social welfare requires that the
charging station has the complete information of the utilities of the users. Hence, such a pricing
strategy can not be implemented when the charging station does not know the exact utilities of
the users. Note from (9) that the profit maximization is a difficult problem as the user will select
one menu inherently depends on the prices selected for other menus. For example, if the price
selected for a particular contract is high, the user will be reluctant to take that compared to a
lower price one. The profit is a discontinuous function of the prices and thus, the problem may
not be convex even when the marginal distribution of the utilities are concave.
We have already seen (Corollary 1) that a pricing strategy which can maximize the ex-post
social welfare, however, it does not give any positive profit. We now show that there exists a
pricing strategy which may provide better profit to the charging station while maximizing the
ex-post social welfare. First, we introduce a notation which we use throughout.
15If the user is reluctant to charge if it does not get a positive payoff, then, we can reduce the price by  > 0 amount. In that
case, it will be (1− ) optimal profit-maximizing strategy.
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Definition 4. Let Lk,l,t be the lowest end-point of the marginal distribution of the utility Uk,l,t.
Theorem 4. Consider the pricing strategy:
pk,l,t = vl,t − v−k + (max
i,j
{Lk,i,j − vi,j + v−k})+. (12)
The pricing strategy maximizes the ex-post social welfare.
The profit is (maxi,j{Lk,i,j − vi,j + v−k})+.
The pricing strategy maximizes the ex-post social welfare similar to Corollary 1. This is
also the maximum possible profit that the charging station can have under the condition that
it maximizes the ex-post social welfare with probability 1. However, it may not maximize the
expected profit of the charging station or in other words, the pricing strategy which maximizes
the expected profit needs not maximize the ex-post social welfare. Hence, unlike in the scenario
where the charging station is clairvoyant (Theorem 3) there may not exist a profit maximization
strategy which is also a social welfare maximizer when the charging station is unaware of
the utilities. Note that the user surplus is not 0, hence, uncertainty regarding the user’s utility
functions is required for a positive consumer’s surplus.
Also, note the similarity with Theorem 3. If the user knows the utility, then Lk,l,t = uk,l,t as
there is no uncertainty and we get back the pricing strategy stated in Theorem 3.
Note that if maxl,t(Lk,l,t−vl,t+v−k) > 0, then such a pricing strategy gives a positive profit to
the charging station. If the charging station has large storage or large renewable energy harvesting
devices, then, the cost vl,t − v−k will be lower and thus, the charging station can get a higher
profit. It also increases the user surplus, as the price set by the charging station decreases. Thus,
the impact of higher degrees of renewable energy integration for the charging station increases
both the profit of the charging station and the user surplus. The above illustrates the importance
of the storage and harvesting energy devices in the charging station. The regulator (e.g. FERC)
can also provide incentives to the charging station to set up those devices as the pricing strategy
increases profit to the charging station as well as the ex-post social welfare.
In the extreme, when vl,t = 0 for all l and t, then the profit of the charging station becomes
maximum. However, further decreasing vl,t will not have any effect on the profit of the charging
station as well as the user surplus, thus, it also shows the investment that the charging station
needs to make for storage and renewable energy harvesting devices.
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Also note that the users which have higher utilities i.e. Lk,l,t is higher, it will give more profits
to the charging station.
The charging station needs to know the lowest end-points of the support set of the utilities
unlike in Corollary 1. However, the charging station does not need to know the exact distribution
functions of the utilities. The lowest end-point can be easily obtained from the historical data.
For example, Lk,l,t may be computed by the lowest possible price that the user accepts for the
energy level l and the deadline t.
2) Guaranteed positive profit to the Charging station: In Theorem 4 the charging station
only has a positive profit if maxl,t{Lk,l,t − vl,t + vk} > 0. In the case, the above condition is
not satisfied, then the charging station’s profit will be 0. Naturally, the question is whether there
exists a pricing strategy which gives a guaranteed positive profit to the charging station without
decreasing the social welfare much. In the following we provide such a pricing strategy.
First note that by the continuity of the joint distribution function we have the following
Lemma 1. Let for each  > 0, there exists a δ > 0 such that
Pr(max
l,t
{Uk,l,t − vl,t + v−k} ≥ 0)
≤ + Pr(max
l,t
{Uk,l,t − vl,t + v−k − δ} ≥ 0) (13)
Theorem 5. Fix an  > 0. Now, consider the pricing strategy
pk,l,t = vl,t − v−k + δ() (14)
where δ() is the δ which satisfies the Lemma 1.
Then such a pricing strategy maximizes the ex-post social welfare with probability 1− .
Outline of proof: First, note that adding a constant does not change the optimal solution.
Hence, if (l∗, t∗) = argmaxl,t(uk,l,t − vl,t + v−k), then (l,∗ , t∗) is also optimal for price strategy
in (14). The rest of the proof follows from Lemma 1. Lemma 1 entails that there exists some
δ > 0 such that it will ensure that the price strategy is off from the social welfare maximizer
pricing strategy by at most 1−  in probability.
Note that the pricing strategy stated in (14) gives a positive profit of δ() amount irrespective
of the menu selected by the user. Note that the assumption of a continuous distribution is key.
If the distributions are discrete, then δ() may be 0. Hence, the charging station may get zero
profit.
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The expected profit of the charging station for the above pricing strategy can be readily
obtained–
Theorem 6. Suppose that pk,l,t = vl,t− v−k + β, then the expected profit of the charging station
is βmaxl,t{Pr(Uk,l,t ≥ vl,t − v−k + β)}.
Outline of the Proof: Note that if a user selects any of the contracts, then the charging station’s
profit is β. Hence, the charging station’s expected profit is β times the probability that at least
one of the contracts will be accepted.
The regulator such as FERC can select β judiciously to trade off between the profit of the
charging station and the user surplus. We empirically study the effect of β in Section VI.
Now, we provide an example where the above pricing strategy can also be a profit maximizing
for a suitable choice of β. First, we introduce a notation
Definition 5. Let ζ = max{γ|γ = argmaxβ≥0β{maxi,j Pr(Uk,i,j > β + vi,j − v−k)}}.
Note that since Uk,l,t is bounded and the probability distribution is continuous, thus, ζ exists.
Note from Theorem 6 that ζ corresponds to the β for which the charging station can get the
maximum possible profit when the prices are of the form pk,l,t = vl,t − v−k + β.
Now consider a class of widely seen utility functions
Assumption 1. Suppose that the utility function Uk,l,t = (Yk,l,t + Xk)+ for all l & t; Yk,l,t is
a constant and known to the charging station, however, Xk is a random variable and whose
realized value is not known to the charging station.
In the above class of utility function, the uncertainty is only regarding the realized value of
the random variable Xk. Note that Xk is independent of l and t, hence,Xk is considered to be
an additive white noise.
It is important to note that we do not put any assumption whether Xk should be drawn from a
continuous or discrete distribution. However, if the distribution is discrete, we need the condition
that ζ must exist.
Theorem 7. Consider the pricing strategy pk,l,t = vl,t−v−k+ζ; where ζ is defined in Definition 5,
The pricing strategy maximizes the expected profit of the charging station (given in (9)) when
the utility functions are of the form given in Assumption 1.
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Remark: The above result is surprising. It shows that a simple pricing mechanism such as
fixed profit can maximize the expected payoff for a large class of utility functions. However, if
the utilities do not satisfy Assumption 1 then, the above pricing strategy may not be optimal.
C. The pricing algorithm
1) User k comes at time tk.
2) The charging station solves the linear programming problem Pl,t (eq. (7)) and finds the
additional cost vl,t − v−k for fulfilling the contract (l, t) for user k for each l and t.
3) The charging station selects the price pk,l,t = vl,t− v−k + maxi,j{Lk,i,j − vi,j + v−k}+ + β.
where β ≥ 0.
4) The user selects the contract which maximizes its payoff (eq.(6)).
Note that when β = 0 gives the worst possible payoff to the charging station as discussed before.
The charging station needs to solve the linear programming problem Pl,t. The linear programing
problem can be efficiently solved by many solvers such as MOSEK, CPLEX, Simplex, CVX,
and Linprog tool of MATLAB.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
We numerically study and compare various pricing strategies presented in this paper. We
evaluate the profit of the charging station and the user’s surplus achieved in those pricing
strategies. We also show that our mechanism requires less charging spots compared to our
nearest pricing model.
A. Simulation Setup
Similar to [22], the user’s utility for energy x is taken to be of the form min{−ax2 + bx, b
2
4a
}.
Thus, the user’s utility is a strictly increasing and concave function in the amount energy
consumed x. The quadratic utility functions for EV charging have also been considered in [23].
Note that the user’s desired level of charging is b/(2a). We assume that b/(2a) is a random
variable. [24] shows that in a commercial charging station, the average amount of energy
consumed per EV is 6.9kWh with standard deviation 4.9kWh. We thus consider that b/(2a)
is a truncated Gaussian random variable with mean 6.9kWh and standard deviation 4.9kWh in
the interval [2, 20]. We assume a is a uniform random variable in the interval [1/20, 1/8].
From [24], the deadline or the time spent by an electric vehicle in a commercial charging
is distributed with an exponential distribution with mean 2.5 hours. Thus, we also consider the
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preferred deadline (Tpref ) of the user to be an exponentially distributed random variable with
mean 2.5. The user strictly prefers a lower deadline. Hence, we assume that the utility is a convex
decreasing function of the deadline [12]. The utility of the user after the preferred deadline is
considered to be 0. Hence, the user’s utility is
Uk,l,t = min{−al2 + lb, b2/4a}×
(exp(Tpref − t− tk)− 1)+/(exp(Tpref − tk)− 1) (15)
The arrival process of electric vehicles is considered to be a Poisson arrival process. However,
the arrival rates vary over time. For example, during the peak-hours (8 am to 5pm) the arrival
rate is higher compared to the off-peak hours. We, thus, consider a non-homogeneous Poisson
process with the arrival rate is 15 (5, resp.) vehicles per hour during the peak period (off-peak
period, resp.). We also assume that the maximum charging rate Rmax is 3.3 Kw.
We assume that the renewable energy is harvested according to a truncated Gaussian distribu-
tion with mean 2 and variance 2 per hour. The storage unit is assumed to be of capacity 20kW-h.
Initial battery level is assumed to be 0 i.e. it is fully discharged. The prices for the conventional
energy is assumed to be governed by Time-of-Use (ToU) time scale. Thus, the cost of buying
the conventional energy varies over time.
B. Results
We consider the scenario where the charging station is unaware of the exact utilities of the
users, however, it knows the distribution function. We consider the pricing strategy that we have
introduced in Section V-B–
pk,l,t = vl,t − v−k + max
i,j
{Lk,i,j − vi,j + v−k}+ + β.
Recall from Definition 4 that Lk,l,t is the lowest end-point of the utility Uk,l,t. We study the
impact of β.
1) Effect on Percentage of the users admitted: Fig. 3 shows that as β increases the number
of admitted users decreases. However, the decrement is slow initially. As β becomes larger than
a threshold, the price selected to the users becomes very large, and thus, a fewer number of EVs
are admitted.
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2) Effect of β on User’s Surplus and Profit of the charging station: The total surpluses of
the users decreases with increase in β (Fig. 4) as the user pays larger price when β increases.
The user surplus is maximum at β = 0. The decrement of total users’ surplus is not significant
with β for β < 1.6. However, as β > 1.6, it decreases rapidly. For β < 1.6, the number of users
served does not decrease much with β. Hence, the total users’ surpluses decrease slowly.
As β increases the profit increases initially (Fig. 5). However, as β > 3, the number of users
served decreases rapidly, hence, the profit also drops.
At high values of β both users’ surpluses and the profit decrease significantly. Low values of
β give high users’ surpluses, however, the profit is low. β ∈ [0.8, 1.6] is the best candidate for
the balance between profit and users’ surpluses.
3) Effect on the average deadline: Our analysis shows that users spend more time in the
charging station with the increase in β (Fig. 6). As β increases, the users which have preferences
for lower deadlines have to pay more; since the cost of fulfilling lower deadline contracts is
high. Hence, those users are reluctant to accept the contract. Thus, the accepted users spend
more time in the charging station. Though the increment of the average time spent by an EV is
not exponential with β. The average time spent by an EV is 2.5 hours for β = 1.2 which is in
accordance with the average time spent by an EV [24].
4) Effect on the maximum number of active users: Since the average time spent by users in
the charging station increases with β and the number of admitted users are almost the same for
β ≤ 1.2, hence the number of active users increases initially as β increases (Fig. 7). Though the
maximum never reaches beyond 22 for any value of β. However, when β > 1.2, the number of
active users decreases with β.
5) Advantages of our proposed mechanism: Fig. 7 shows that our pricing algorithm requires
less charging spots compared to the differentiated pricing mechanism [16], [17] closest to our
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proposed approach. Similar to [16], [17] the users select the amount of energy to be consumed
for each time period based on the price set by the charging station. We assume that the user
will not charge beyond the preferred deadline and before the arrival time. In [16], [17] the EVs
tend to spend more time as it reduces the cost16 and thus, the maximum of the number of
EVs present at any time is also higher (Fig. 7) compared to our proposed mechanism.17 In our
proposed mechanism, the charging station controls the time spent by an EV through pricing and
results into lower charging spots.
6) Effect on the average energy: As β increases users only with higher utilities should accept
the contracts. Thus, the average charging amount for each EV should increase with β. However,
Fig. 8 shows that for β ≤ 0.8, the average energy consumed by each EV decreases with the
increase in β. The apparent anomaly is due to the fact that the users with higher demand but
with smaller deadline preferences, may have to pay more because of the increase in the price
to fulfill the contract as β increases. Hence, such users will not accept the offers which result
into initial decrement of the average energy consumption with the increase in β. However, as β
becomes large, only the users with higher demand accept the offers, hence, the average energy
consumption increases. However, the increment is only linear. In fact for β = 2, the average
energy consumption per EV is around 6.9 kW-h.
7) Effect on the Cost of the EV charging station: The cost of the EV charging station decreases
with the increase in β (Fig. 9). Since the time spent by users increases and thus, the demand
16An EV is removed when it is fully charged.
17We assume that the EV is removed after its reported deadline. When the deadline is over, the EV is moved to a parking
spot without any charging facility.
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Fig. 11. Left-hand figure shows the amount of energy drawn from the battery of the charging station at various
times for different values of β. The right-hand figure shows the amount of energy drawn from the grid at various
times for different values of β.
of the users can be met through renewable energies. The charging station buys a lower amount
of conventional energies which results in lower cost for the charging station. When β ≤ 1.6,
the number of admitted users decreases sub-linearly, still the cost decreases linearly. Hence,
the FERC will prefer this setting as it decreases the cost without decreasing the admitted users
much.
8) Effect on the price selected by the charging station: The price is higher during the peak
period when the arrival rates is higher and the time-of-use price is high (Fig. 10). Hence, the
pricing mechanism is consistent with the FERC’s objective of selecting higher prices during
the peak time to flatten the demand curve. A new price is selected when an EV arrives. As β
decreases the admitted users is higher, hence the price variation is also higher as β decreases.
Also note that when the number of active users is large, serving additional user can be significant
and thus, the price is also high.
9) Impact on the energy drawn from the grid and the storage of the charging station:
Fig. 11 shows that as β increases the energy bought from the grid decreases. This is because
the number of accepted users decreases with β. The energy used from the battery also decreases
as β increases. Note that by selecting a β the charging station can also limit the peak energy
consumption from the grid. Fig. 11 also shows that when no menu based pricing is applied
i.e., the EVs are charged as soon as they arrive, then, the peak energy consumption from the
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a ∼ U [1/10, 1/4]. We show the consumer surplus and profit of the charging station for β = 0, 1.2, 2.
grid is very high. Even β = 0 lowers the energy consumption from the grid significantly. The
energy used from the battery of the charging station is also low when there is no menu-based
pricing. The above shows the usefulness of the menu-based pricing in reducing the peak-energy
consumption and efficient use of the renewable energy.
10) Impact of a: Fig. 12 shows that as a increases, the profit and the user’s surpluses both
decrease. Note that as a increases, the utility decreases, and the preferred energy
b
2a
also
decreases, hence, the profit and the user’s surplus both decrease.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
We propose an online menu-based pricing mechanism for EV charging. Specifically, we
consider that the charging station will offer a price to each arriving user for a plethora of
options; the user selects either one of them or rejects all. We show that there exists a prior-
free pricing strategy which maximizes the ex-post social welfare. We characterize the maximum
possible profit that the charging station can get while maximizing the ex-post social welfare.
The charging station only needs to know the lower end-points of the utilities to implement the
pricing strategy. The profit increases if the renewable energy penetration increases or the storage
capacity of the charging station increases. However, the increment is bounded.
The charging station can not simultaneously maximize the profit and the ex-post social welfare
unless it is clairvoyant. We propose a fixed profit pricing scheme which provides a fixed profit
to the charging station. The above can also maximize the expected profit of the charging station
under some assumptions which frequently arise in practice. Numerical evaluation suggests that
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the menu-based pricing scheme can reduce the peak-demand and utilize the limited number of
charging spots more efficiently compared to the baseline approaches.
Following this work, we have considered the case where the EVs can inject energies by
discharging via a Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) service which can enhance the profits of the charging
station [25].
We considered that the EV charging station is myopic which does not consider the future
arrival process while selecting an optimal price for an incoming EV. In future we consider the
case where the charging station knows the statistics of the future arrival process of the EVs
and selects price accordingly. We also considered that the charging station has the only type
of charger (either fast or slow), the characterization of prices when the charging station selects
prices for different chargers is also left for the future. Considering stochastic pattern of energy
harvesting is an important next step. Finally, the consideration of the multiple charging stations
which set prices in a competitive manner also constitutes a future research direction.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 2
Note that the user k only selects the menu which fetches the highest payoff. Hence, the payoff
of user k is
(max
l,t
{uk,l,t − pk,l,t})+ (16)
Since pk,l,t = vl,t − v−k, thus, the usersurplus is
(max
l,t
(uk,l,t − vl,t + v−k))+ (17)
The charging station’s profit is pk,l,t− vl,t if the user selects the menu (l, t) and −v−k if the user
does not select any price option. Since pk,l,t = vl,t − v−k, thus, the charging station’s profit is
−v−k irrespective of the decision of the user. Hence, the social welfare is
max{max
l,t
(uk,l,t − vl,t), v−k} (18)
Hence, under the pricing strategy, the value of the social welfare is the same as in Theorem 1.
B. Proof of Theorem 3
First, we show that the pricing strategy maximizes the profit of the charging station.
From (8), the highest possible profit of the charging station is
max{uk,l∗,t∗ − vl∗,t∗ ,−v−k} (19)
If the price is selected as stated in the theorem, then, if uk,l∗,t∗ − vl∗,t∗ < −v−k, then, the profit
of the charging station is −v−k.
On the other hand, if uk,l∗,t∗ − vl∗,t∗ ≥ −v−k, then the price pk,l,t to user k is
pk,l,t = vl,t + uk,l∗,t∗ − vl∗,t∗ (20)
User will select a price pk,l,t if uk,l,t − pk,l,t ≥ uk,i,j − pk,i,j for all i, j and uk,l,t ≥ pk,l,t. Since
uk,l∗,t∗ − vl∗,t∗ ≥ uk,l,t − vl,t, thus, the user will only select the price menu pk,l∗,t∗ . Note that at
only pk,l∗,t∗ the user surplus is 0, at other prices it is less than or equal to 0. Thus, the profit of
the charging station is uk,l∗,t∗ − vl∗,t∗ .
Now, we show that such a pricing scheme also maximizes the social welfare.
Note that in the above pricing strategy, the user’s surplus is always 0. On the other hand,
the profit that the charging station makes is max{maxl,t(uk,l,t− vl,t),−v−k}. Hence, the pricing
strategy obtains the optimal value of social welfare by Theorem 1.
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C. Proof of Theorem 4
If maxi,j{Lk,i,j−vi,j +v−k} ≤ 0, then the pricing strategy is the same as in Theorem 1 which
we already proved to be ex-post social welfare maximizer. Hence, we consider the case when
maxi,j{Lk,i,j − vi,j + v−k} > 0.
Now, we show that for every possible realization uk,l,t such a pricing strategy will maximize
the social welfare. Note that maxl,t{uk,l,t − vl,t + v−k} > 0 since maxl,t{Lk,l,t − vl,t + v−k} > 0
and Lk,l,t is the lowest end-point of the distribution of Uk,l,t. Hence by Theorem 1 the maximum
value of the ex-post social welfare is maxl,t{uk,l,t−vl,t}. Now, we show that the pricing strategy
defined in (12) will give rise the above optimal value of social welfare.
Note that the user’s surplus is
(max
i,j
{uk,i,j − pk,i,j})+ (21)
First, we show that maxi,j{uk,i,j−pk,i,j} ≥ 0 if maxi,j{Lk,i,j−vi,j+v−k} > 0 and pk,i,j is given
by (12). Suppose not, i.e. maxi,j{uk,i,j − pk,i,j} < 0. Let (l∗, t∗) = argmaxi,j{Lk,i,j − vi,j + v−k}.
Then, pk,l∗,t∗ = Lk,l∗,t∗ . Since uk,l∗,t∗ ≥ Lk,l∗,t∗ , hence, uk,l∗,t∗ − pk,l∗,t∗ > 0 which leads to a
contradiction. Thus, maxi,j{uk,i,j − pk,i,j} > 0.
Thus, the user surplus is maxi,j{uk,i,j − pk,i,j}. Since pk,l,t = vl,t − v−k + r where r =
maxi,j{Lk,i,j − vi,j + v−k} is constant and independent of index l and t. Hence, the user will
select the price menu pk,l∗,t∗ such that (l∗, t∗) = argmaxl,t{uk,l,t−vl,t} . The profit of the charging
station is pk,l∗,t∗ − vl∗,t∗ . Thus, the ex-post social welfare is
uk,l∗,t∗ − pk,l∗,t∗ + pk,l∗,t∗ − vl∗,t∗
= uk,l∗,t∗ − vl∗,t∗
= max
l,t
{uk,l,t − vl,t} (22)
Thus, for each realized values of the utilities uk,l,t, the pricing strategy (12) provides the maximum
social welfare. Hence, the result follows.
D. Proof of Theorem 5
Suppose that uk,l,t be the realized values of Uk,l,t. Note that if maxl,t{uk,l,t−pk,l,t} ≥ 0 where
pk,l,t is given by (14) then the user selects the price menu pk,l∗,t∗ where
(l∗, t∗) = argmax l,t{uk,l,t − vl,t}. (23)
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Hence, the social welfare is maxl,t{uk,l,t − vl,t} which is the same as the social welfare by
Theorem 1.
On the other hand if maxl,t{uk,l,t − pk,l,t} < 00, then the social welfare is −v−k.
Hence, by Theorem 1, the only cases where the social welfare is not maximized when
maxl,t{uk,l,t − pk,l,t} < 0, however, maxl,t{uk,l,t − vl,t + v−k} ≥ 0. However, by the definition
of δ() such a scenario can only occur with probability . Hence, the result follows.
E. Proof of Theorem 7
Suppose the statement is false. Without loss of generality, assume that pk,l,t = vl,t− v−k +αl,t
where αl,t 6= α for some l and t achieves a strictly higher expected payoff than the pricing
strategy pk,l,t = vl,t − v−k + α.
The expected profit of the charging station for pricing strategy pk,l,t = vl,t−v−k +αl,t is given
by
L∑
l=1
T∑
t=tk+1
(pk,l,t − vl,t + v−k) Pr(Rl,t)− v−k =
L∑
l=1
T∑
t=tk+1
αl,t Pr(Rl,t)− v−k (24)
Now, we evaluate the expression Pr(Rl,t). The user k will select the menu pk,l,t with a positive
probability if Yk,l,t +Xk ≥ vl,t − v−k + αl,t and for every (i, j) 6= (l, t),
αl,t − αi,j ≤ Yk,l,t − vl,t − Yk,i,j + vi,j (25)
Since Yk,l,t, Yk,i,j, vl,t, vi,j are fixed, hence, the above inequality is either satisfied or not satisfied
with probability 1. More specifically, the user selects the menu (l, t) if Yk,l,t+Xk ≥ vl,t−v−k+αl,t
and
Yk,l,t − vl,t − αl,t ≥ max
i,j
(Yk,i,j − vi,j − αi,j) (26)
Without loss of generality, assume that αl1,t1 be the maximum value for which the above
inequality is satisfied i.e.
αl1,t1 = max{αl,t : Yk,l,t − vl,t − αl,t ≥ max
i,j
(Yk,i,j − vi,j − αi,j)} (27)
The random variable Xk only affects the probability whether Yk,l,t +Xk ≥ vl,t − v−k + αl1,t1 or
not. Hence, the charging station’s expected profit is upper bounded by
αl1,t1 Pr(Xk ≥ vl1,t1 − v−k + αl1,t1 − Yk,l1,t1) (28)
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Note that by the definition of α (Definition 5),
αmax
l,t
Pr(Yk,l,t +Xk ≥ vl,t − v−k + α)
≥ αl1,t1 Pr(Xk ≥ vl1,t1 − v−k + αl1,t1 − Yk,l1,t1) (29)
However by Theorem 6 the expected payoff of the charging station when it selects the price
vl,t − v−k + α is given by the expression in the left hand of the expression in (29). Hence, this
leads to a contradiction. Thus, the result follows.
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